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Abstract: In article are presented results of empiric research in threat estimate criterion, by which is
determined 15 criterions that are indispensably graded during performing the threat
estimate. Correct choice of threat estimate criterion is basic condition to contemplate source
and type of threat in managing business with cash money and values. Research is conducted
among companies authorized for threat estimate performance. Therefore, the results of this
research represent contribution to defining threat estimate methodology in managing
business with cash money and values.
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Introduction
European countries have united their interests in bank institutions and founded
European Banking Federation (Federation Bancaire de L’Union Europeenne - FBE).
European Banking Federation (2005) momentarily has 28 full members and 7
associate members. Among the associate members is the Republic of Croatia also.
Data about number of robberies committed in certain countries per million
inhabitants from FBE report (2002, 2004, 2005) are presented in Chart 1. The largest
number of robberies happens in Italy and this country significantly differs from
others. After Italy follows Germany and Austria. They have slightly bigger number of
robberies than transitional countries. According to presented data Slovenia and
Croatia essentially do not stand out from countries around them.
The risk, that is according to FBE defined as probability of attack on bank offices
(total number of offices divided by number of committed robberies), is growing, and
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at the moment in Europe the rate is 1:35, to be exact, the robbery is committed in one
out of 35 bank offices.
Figure 1: Number of robberies per million inhabitants
Of great concern is the growth of attack on cash money and valuable’s transport
vehicles. In those attacks often army weapons are used. On the basis of conducted
research in FBE report (2005), it is concluded that the balance between expected
robbery and risk in principle has an impact on growth or diminishing certain type of
criminal act. For example, burglaries into money institutions which expect large loot
are in correlation with applying army weapons and type of attack. Information about
large loot has an impact on preparation, organization and equipping criminal groups.
Conception and Purpose of Threat Estimate
Efficient managing of potential loss and damage in conducting business with cash
money and valuables is one of conditions for successful realization of business
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with cash money and valuables must be integrated in entire business of financial
institution.
According to Lamoreaux (2005), the goal of safety process and safety system that
is managed, is realization of acceptable state of safety in which risks are identified,
assessed, and diminished or completely removed. Reinstatement of safety system, its
bringing up to date and development is based upon threat estimate by which sources
and type of threat are defined, then critical places in business process, consequences
of threat and optimal measures of protection from determined threats. (e.g. Dworken
et al., 2003).
Considering the frequency of appearance, financial institutions are at the highest
threat point in robberies. Reason for that is found in easy availability to larger
amounts of money and relatively short time needed for a criminal act to be executed
(e.g. Palaèiæ and Hutinski, 2006).
Threat estimate is procedure of probability of events and estimate which
represents possible danger and threat to people, money and valuables, as well to
business processes. To estimate, it means to make judgments, gradation and
assessment. Procedure of estimate and assessment will result with right outcome only
if it is based on relevant data. The point of making a threat estimate is recognizing
source and type of danger, determining the risk level, in other words probability of
event emergence that represents danger to people, property and business processes,
for-seeing probability and frequency of its emergence, determining risk size, and
diminishing the risk through setting optimal measures of protection and raising up
defense capabilities.
There are number of distinct approaches to threat and risk analysis. However,
these essentially break down into two types: quantitative and qualitative (e.g. Turner,
Gelles et al., 2003). Quantitative Risk Analysis approach employs two fundamental
elements; the probability of an event occurring and the likely loss should it occur.
Qualitative Risk Analysis is the most widely used approach to risk analysis.
Probability data is not required and only estimated potential loss is used. Most
qualitative risk analysis methodologies make use of a number of interrelated
elements (e.g. Vidalis, Blyth et al., 2002). Key elements for quantitative threat
estimate are determining estimate criterion and its significance.
Determining the sample
Research criterion of threat estimate is conducted in companies that deal in private
protection business in Croatia. Those companies are authorized for making threat
estimates in financial institutions. By that the aimed population is identified. On
January 1st 2006 in Croatia, 234 authorized businesses for private protection were
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registered. The frame for sample selection is alphabetical list of authorized
businesses for private protection, which for research needs provided by the Croatian
Security Association.
Random sample is chosen out of basic group, and is determined with help of table
of random numbers (e.g. ugaj, Dumièiæ, Dušak et al., 1999). By setting the sample,
the method of sample selection without repetition is applied. To be precise, elements
for sample are chosen by order, and same have after selection remained in the basic
group and by that procedure took part in selection of the next element for sample.
The size of a sample is based upon two judgmental decisions, on reliability level
and on permitted error in sampling. The subject of research is safety of people and
property, therefore, the 1,28 coefficient of trust is set, which is given in chosen
probability assessment of 80%, with allowed error of ±10% and coefficient in
population variation of 50%. Determined size of simple random sample (n = 41)
represent total number of authorized businesses for private protection (sample unit)
that are included in empiric research, while, the research unit is person that conducts
threat estimates. The sample is representative and probable. Relatively speaking, the
sample makes 17.52 % of main group, and it can be concluded that the contained
population is representative. Representative sample is achieved by correct random
election of elements in basic group, basic characteristics of those elements that are
similar to basic group, than by reliability level and allowed error.
Research Methodology
For research needs Likert type of survey questionnaire has been composed. Research
has been conducted through e-mail during month of May 2006. With the help of
survey the opinions of participants is searched, for their viewpoints and significance
of criterion thus being determined. For determining threat estimate criterion, methods
of analytical statistics are being used to enable on basis of data, conclusions about
characteristics of entire population.
Characteristics of Examinees
Regarding the question about their own knowledge of threat theory, the acquired
opinion of the examinees on their own knowledge of the subject one declared having
to know the theory of threat. Total of 14.3% examinees think to know the threat
theory poorly, 40% of examinees, good, 34.3% think to know very well, and 11.4%
think to know very well.
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Figure 2: Personal knowledge in threat theory
In group that declared to know the threat theory very well, first half has work
experience from 3 to 5 years, and other half from 11 to 20 years. Total of 20% of
examinees have work experience from 11 to 20 years and grade their threat theory
knowledge very good.
Regarding the data combined in Table 1. it has been conducted  2 test of
independence of peculiarity of work experience in field of technical protection and
threat estimate knowledge according to which it is considered by zero hypotheses
that all classifications are mutually independent.
With level of coincidental appearance probability p = 0.05 and  2 = 3.4 it is
determined that the difference among classifications is not statistically significant, in
fact the difference is coincidental. So it is concluded that there is no mutual
dependence in work experience on field of technical protection and knowledge in
threat theory. Considering that the difference is not statistically significant,
connection degree does not need to be calculated. The fields that contain the data of
0.0% means that there is no examinees with mentioned feature.
Although percentage part of people with single characteristics varies from 2.9 -
20% statistically significant difference among classifications is not found. Majority
of examinees, depending on work experience (37.1%) falls in category from 11 to 20
years, and 40% of examinees declares to know the threat theory well (good).
Statistically significant difference is determined among good and excellent knowing
the threat theory with coincidental appearance probability less then 5%.









Table 1: Contingence in threat theory knowledge regarding work experience





















0.0 2.9 2.9 8.6 0.0 14.3*
from 3 to
5 years
0.0 0.0 8.6 11.4 5.7 25.7*
from 6 to
10 years
0.0 11.4 8.6 2.9 0.0 22.9*
from 11 to
20 years
0.0 0.0 20.0 11.4 5.7 37.1*
Total % 0.0 14.3* 40.0** 34.3* 11.4* 100.0
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Results in Threat Estimate Criterion Research
Considering, that there is no unique threat estimate system, the research had a goal to
determine the criterion on basis of which the threat is being estimated. Therefore, in
conducted research the examinees have declared on the basis of implementation of
certain threat estimate criterion in managing business with cash money and valuables
in their own practice. Valuing vulnerability, as a threat estimate criterion is least
applicable in practice (35.9% examinees do not value vulnerability). Even 25% of
examinees during estimate do not grade the reaction speed of security officers and
police, 16% of examinees do not grade applying organizational protection measures,
and 18% availability of cash money and valuables to perpetrators.
By Pearson coefficient of linear correlation between measured applicable and
inapplicable appearance of certain threat estimate criterion, it is determined that
correlation of mentioned features is weak.
By analysis of given results, with probability of coincidental appearance less than
5%, it is defined that in threat estimate are used criterion from table 2.
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Table 2: Implementation of threat estimate criterion





1 Data about facility and location 100.0 0.0
2 Exposure of facility and location to threat 100.0 0.0
3 Data about business process 100.0 0.0
4 Type and number of users 100.0 0.0
5 Work regime and way of facility usage 100.0 0.0
6 Applying technical protection measures 100.0 0.0
7 Applying organizational protection measures 82.1 17.9**
8 Availability of money and values to perpetrators 83.3 16.7**
9 Speed of reaction from security officers and police 75.0 25.0**
10 Total efficiency of existing protection 78.9 21.1**
11 Data about harmful events up to now 97.5 2.5**
12 Valuing the property 90.0 10.0**
13 Valuing certain type of threat 88.9 11.1**
14 Valuing the vulnerability 64.1 35.9
15 Valuing the risk 100.0 0.0
Average 90.7** 9.3
**p<0.01
The estimate criterion ‘applying organizational protection measures’ totally
17.9% examinees do not grade, from which 42.9% examinees that have declared to
know the threat theory very good and 14.3% examinees that know the threat theory
poorly (weak). By conductig  2 test, with the coincidental appearance probability
level p = 0.01 and value  2 = 12.6 it is concluded that the difference between
applicability and inapplicability of criterion is statistically significant, to be exact,
not coincidental.
The estimate criterion ‘availability of money and values to perpetrators’, 16.7%
examinees do not grade, from which 20% examinees that excellent know the threat
theory, 40% examinees know the threat theory, very good and 20% examinees that
know the threat theory good and weak. Through the  2 test, with coincidental
appearance probability level p = 0.01 and value  2 = 15.11 we learn that the
difference between applicability and inapplicability of criterion is statistically
significant, to be exact, not coincidental.
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The estimate criterion ‘speed of reaction from security officers and police’ does
not grade 25% examinees, from which 33.3% examinees that have declared to know
the threat theory very good, 55.6% examinees that have declared to know the threat
theory good and 11.1% examinees that know the threat theory poorly (weak). From
conducted  2 test, with coincidental appearance probability level p = 0.01 and value

2 = 8.25 it is concluded that the difference between applicability and inapplicability
of criterion is statistically significant, to be exact, not coincidental.
The estimate criterion ‘total efficiency of existing protection’ does not grade
totally 21.1% examinees, from which 25% examinees that have declared to know the
threat theory very good, 62.5% examinees that have declared to know the threat
theory good i 12.5% examinees that know the threat theory poorly (weak).
Conducted  2 test, with coincidental appearance probability level p = 0.01 and value

2 = 10.31 shows clearly that the difference between applicability and inapplicability
of criterion is statistically significant, to be exact, it is not coincidental.
The estimate criterion ‘data about harmful events up to now’ does not grade 2.5%
examinees, and only one of examinees had declared to have week knowledge about
threat theory. The 2 test, with coincidental appearance probability level p = 0.01 and
value  2 = 31.1 it is concluded that the difference between applicability and
inapplicability of criterion is statistically significant, to be exact, it is not
coincidental.
The estimate criterion ‘valuing the property’ does not grade totally 10% of
examinees, from which 25% examinees that have declared to know the threat theory
very good, 50% examinees that have declared to know the threat theory good and
25% examinees that know the threat theory poorly (weak). By conducted - test, with
coincidental appearance probability level p = 0.01 and value  2 test = 20.8 concluds
that the difference between applicability and inapplicability of criterion is
statistically significant, to be exact, it is not coincidental.
The estimate criterion ‘valuing certain type of threat’ does not grade 11.1%
examinees, from which 25% examinees that know the threat theory excellent, 25%
examinees that have declared to know the threat theory good and 50% examinees
examinees that know the threat theory poorly (weak). Conducted  2 test, with
coincidental appearance probability level p = 0.01 and value  2 = 20.8 it is evident
that the difference between applicability and inapplicability of criterion is
statistically significant, to be exact, it is not coincidental.
The estimate criterion ‘valuing the vulnerability’ does not grade totally 35.9%
examinees, from which 14.3% examinees that have declared to know the threat
theory very good, 64.3% examinees that have declared to know the threat theory
good and 21.4% examinees examinees examinees that know the threat theory poorly
(weak). In conducted  2 test, with coincidental appearance probability level p = 0.05
and value  2 = 1.4 it follows that the difference between applicability and
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inapplicability of criterion is not statistically significant, to be exact, it is
coincidental.
Discussion
By conducting empirical research via representative sample of authorized
companies, 15 threat estimate criterion in managing cash money and valuables we
conclude that these need to be graded so that adequate protection measures can be set.
Considering that in Croatia there is no one unique threat estimate system in managing
business with cash money and valuables, the results of this research is a step forward
into the field of defining unique threat estimate system and work methodology.
Results of this research are statistically processed and for each criterion statistical
difference between applicability and inapplicability in practice is determined.
Regarding the characteristics of examinees that have participated in this research,
in fact, their knowledge of threat theory, acceptance of mentioned threat estimate
criterion in managing business with cash money and valuables we propose a
continuance of research in the field.
At the end we can say that results of such research enables the setting of a unique
model of threat estimate in managing business with cash money and valuables
supported by computers that will help achieve security growth of financial
institutions.
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